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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTONAL LAw-FRE

SPEECH-UsE oF LouD SPEAKERS

STETs.-Commonwealth v. Jacobs,. . . Mass....
129 N.E.2d 620 (1955). An ordinance of the city of Quincy, Massachusetts, provided that "no person shall publicly address the people on or passing over any public street" without having first obtained a license to do so from the board of license commissioners
of the city. The defendant, who was under hire by a labor union,
disregarded this ordinance and. operated a sound truck on the
public streets of Quincy from which he played a record urging
listeners not to buy the products of a company with which the
union was in dispute. He was convicted of violating the ordinance. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reversed
the conviction and held the ordinance unconstitutional on its
face. The invalidity of the ordinance lay in the fact that it was a
"complete and indiscriminate prohibition of all public address on
all public streets or grounds without a previous permit." 129
N.E.2d at 621.
This case presents once again the problem of when a municipality may validly regulate the use of sound trucks or loud speakers
on public streets without violating federal or state constitutional
guarantees of freedom of speech.
It is well-settled that the right of a citizen to use public streets
is not absolute and unrestricted but may be directed and controlled in the interest of the common good. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1940). This principal was reiterated by Justice Roberts when, speaking for the United States Supreme Court
in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940) (dictum), he
said:
ON PUBLIC

When clear and present danger of riot, disorder, interference with
trafie upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public
safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of the State to prevent or
punish is obvious. (Emphasis added.)

However, an ordinance which provided that it was within the
unconditional discretionary power of one individual to determine
whether a license shall be given for use of a loud speaker on the
public streets was held to be unconstitutional on its face. Saia v.
New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948). In this case the ordinance stipulated that no one could use a loud speaker on any street or in any
public place where the purpose of the loud speaker was to attract
the attention of the passing public unless the chief of police had
first issued a license for its use. The Supreme Court, in a five-tofour decision, held that the ordinance was invalid because it
(493)
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failed to provide any standards or other criteria to guide the
chief of police in exercising his discretion.
A year later, however, where an ordinance prohibited the use
of sound equipment making "loud and raucous noises" on the
public streets, it was upheld by the Supreme Court. Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). Here, three Justices were of the
opinion that the ordinance was valid because its apparent design
and intent was to prevent "loud and raucous noises" from conflicting with the peace and quiet of the citizens while engaging in
their normal activities. The ordinance was not intended to suppress any individual's right of free speech. Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred because he thought the Supreme Court could
not devise terms on which sound trucks should be allowed to
operate, but that it was a function of the legislatures to decide
whether sound trucks interfere with the peace and quiet and to
legislate accordingly. Mr. Justice Jackson also concurred stating
that even an absolute prohibition of sound equipment from the
public streets would be valid. Three dissenting Justices were of
the opinion that the Saia case required the striking down of the
ordinance on the ground that it flatly prohibited the use of loud
speakers on public streets.
The line between the Saia and Kovacs cases is apparently the
presence or absence of a standard by which the discretion of the
licensing official is limited. State courts passing on the subject
have upheld a variety of ordinances, distinguishing them from
the unlimited discretion condemned in the Saia case and analogizing them to the reasonable standard in the Kovacs case.
An ordinance that designated specific streets from which sound
trucks and amplifying devices were barred was held constitutional in Commonwealth v. Geuss, 168 Pa. Super. 22, 76 A.2d 500
(1950), aff'd per curiam, 368 Pa. 290, 81 A.2d 553 (1951), appeal
dismissed, 342 U.S. 912 (1952). In this instance the ordinance
provided that sound trucks could not be used on certain busy
streets, all but two of which were occupied almost exclusively by
business enterprises. The court held the ordinance valid because
its obvious sole intent was to lessen traffic hazards which would
result from the presence of a sound truck within the congested
area.
An ordinance that required a permit or license be obtained
before using sound equipment on the public streets and provided
standards which set forth the conditions under which a permit or
license would be issued, was held valid in Haggerty v. Kings
County, 117 Cal. App. 2d 470, 256 P.2d 393 (1953). In this case
the ordinance provided that a permit to use loud speakers on
the public streets would be issued unless evidence is presented
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to the licensing board of a clear and present danger that the
granting of the permit would obstruct the orderly movement of
traffic upon the public highways or the granting of the permit
would invade the rights of privacy, or threaten the overthrow by
force of the lawfully established government. The enumeration
of specific standards resulted in the constitutionality of the ordinance.
In the Geuss case and the Haggerty case, the ordinances' language was pitched in permissive terms, excepting certain situations from permissible use of sound amplifying equipment. They
seemingly do not militate against proper free speech. A few cases,
where the language of the ordinances becomes more ambiguous,
have still held the statutes constitutional by virtue of a "standard" found by the courts. In State ex rel. Nicholas v. Headley,
48 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1950), an ordinance which prohibited the
operation on the public streets of any vehicle upon which any
mechanical or sound making device is to be used for the purpose
of attracting attention, except where the vehicle is to be used
in a parade, was held valid. Here a political candidate was arrested for operating a vehicle in which was installed a loud
speaking device through which he broadcast a speech urging
voters to support him. The court held the ordinance valid and
followed the reasoning used in Kovacs v. Cooper, that "the 'loud
noises' emanating from the amplifier 'constituted a traffic hazard
endangering the safety of motorists operating upon the streets.'"
48 So. 2d at 81-82.
Where the ordinance makes unlawful the transmission of "any
loud and raucous noise upon or from any public highway or public
thoroughfare or from any aircraft of any kind whatsoever," it
has been held valid. Haggerty v. Associated Farmers of California, Inc., 44 Cal. 2d 60, 279 P.2d 734 (1955). Representatives
of a labor union were arrested for caravaning along public highways adjacent to farms and using loud speakers to attract the
farmers' attention. Because the ordinance defined what was
meant by "loud and raucous noise" and was directed toward
safeguarding the traveling public by elimination of any distraction that might constitute a hazard to people using the highways,
the court upheld the ordinance.
An ordinance which prohibited the operation of any vehicle
equipped with a loud speaker or public address system upon the
streets of the city by any person, firm, or corporation was held
valid in Brinkman v. Gainesville, 83 Ga. App. 508, 64 S.E.2d 344
(1951). The defendant was arrested for using a loud speaker to
broadcast recorded sermons as he drove through the town. In
upholding the ordinance, the court was primarily influenced by
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the decision rendered in Kovacs v. Cooper. The court stated that
the intention of the ordinance was to prohibit loud noises which
interfered with the constitutional rights of other citizens on the
public streets, and for this reason was not an unlawful restraint
of free speech.
In view of the line which decisions have recognized between
the Saia and Kovacs cases, it is submitted that the court in the
instant case correctly declared the ordinance void. On the one
hand is the interest of protecting free discourse and the promulgation of ideas. On the other hand, there is the power of states
to balance conflicting interests through legislation. Flat prohibition of speech is clearly unconstitutional. But regulation of the
modes and means of speech is not denied the states if reasonable
standards of control are used. The ordinance in the instant case
prohibited all use of loud speakers and sound amplifiers on all
public streets without first obtaining a permit. In effect, it could
have amounted to an absolute prohibition of all public address in
public places.
Edward N. Denn

CRIMINAL LAw-CONsPmACY-HUSBAND AND WI

CAN Fo~m

CoNsPnmcY.-Thompson v. United States, 227 F.2d 671 (5th Cir.
1955). The defendants, husband and wife, were charged with
conspiring with others to violate the White Slave Traffic Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2421-24 (1952), popularly known as the Mann Act.
Their activities consisted of the unlawful transportation in interstate commerce of a woman for immoral purposes. The defendants contended that they could not be convicted of conspiracy
because they were a single legal entity and there was no substantial evidence of the participation of any third parties. They
were found guilty in the district court.
The question on appeal was whether, in view of the common
law rule that a husband and wife were a single legal entity, the
defendants could be guilty of a conspiracy. The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit stated that, since most states by Married
Women's Acts had severed the common law unity of husband
and wife, the fiction should not be carried over to the present
statute and husband and wife can be guilty of a conspiracy. The
court agreed with the opinion in Johnson v. United States, 157
F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1946), that there was no good reason why
the law should not recognize the separation of husband and wife
and their ability to conspire. However, the decision of the district
court was reversed because certain evidence had been improperly admitted.

19561

RECENT DECISIONS

To find a husband and wife guilty of conspiracy the courts
must abrogate a well established common law principle. This
principle was well stated in the case of People v. Miller, 82 Cal.
107, 22 Pac. 934 (1889), where the conviction of a husband and
wife for conspiracy was reversed on the basis of the common law
single entity rule. Conspiracy, reasoned the court, requires two
or more persons. The indictment recited that defendants were
man and wife and therefore did not charge a crime. This common
law principle was so well established in some courts that in
reversing a conviction of a husband and wife for conspiracy the
court said in Dawson v. United States, 10 F.2d 106, 108 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 271 U.S. 687 (1926), ".... a rule so well established
and so generally recognized by the modern authorities should
not be judicially repealed."
The fiction that a husband and wife are a legal entity and cannot be convicted of conspiracy together was held to be valid in
cases extending up to recent years. In Gros v. United States, 138
F.2d 261 (9th Cir. 1943), the court reaffirmed the rule and reversed a conviction of a husband and wife for conspiracy. In
United States v. Shaddix, 43 F. Supp. 330 (S.D. Miss. 1942), the
common law rule was the basis for sustaining a demurrer to an
indictment charging a husband and his wife with conspiracy.
One of the first instances where the common law rule was
criticized appeared as dictum in a Texas case. The court said
that under the Texas penal code no exceptions were made as to
a wifd not being capable of conspiring with her husband to commit
crime. It also stated that in view of the emancipation of women
they should be considered as separate legal entities. Smith v.
State, 48 Tex. Crim. 233, 89 S.W. 817, 821 (1905).
The first case to categorically reject the common law rule of
conjugal unity as a defense to conspiracy was Dalton v. People,
68 Colo. 44, 189 Pac. 37 (1920). In this case the defendant brought
error in the instructions of the lower court when it said he could
be convicted of conspiracy with his wife alone. The Supreme
Court of Colorado affirmed the lower court's instructions as
being proper and also stated that the Married Women's Acts of
Colorado had removed the reason for the common law rule. The
old rule was discordant with the present policy of Colorado law.
A similar argument for the modern rule was presented by the
prosecution in People v. MacMullen, 134 Cal. App. 81, 24 P.2d
794 (1933), but it was rejected by the court because there had
been no express statutory repeal of the old common law rule.
The federal courts have accepted the modem trend of finding
a husband and wife capable of conspiracy without any statutory
changes or provisions. This opinion was first enunciated in John-
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son v. United States, 157 F.2d 209 (D.C. Cir. 1946), where the
court ruled that the relation of husband and wife did not prevent
them from conspiring to commit an offense. Other courts have
circumvented the common law rule without expressly repudiating it. In Jones v. Monson, 137 Wis. 478, 119 N.W. 179 (1909), the
court said that since the conspiracy was not the principal part
of the charge, a husband and wife could be convicted as charged.
The trend of these cases allowing a conviction of husband and
wife for conspiracy has been in line with the law in many other
areas involving husband and wife. With the wife's emancipation
she has been given the right to sue, in her own name, her husband or her husband's estate. Roberts v. Roberts, 185 N.C. 566,
118 S.E. 9 (1923); Franklinv. Wills, 217 F.2d 899 (6th Cir. 1954).
It has been held that marital relations have no effect on property
contracts between husband and wife. See Crossley v. Crossley,
97 Cal. App. 2d 627, 218 P.2d 132 (1950). Married Women's Acts
have removed most of the barriers preventing the conviction
of a husband and wife for conspiracy by giving the wife a separate
legal existence equivalent to that of any other person in view of
the law.
The Supreme Court of Illinois approached the problem in a
realistic manner and gave many reasons for following the modem rule in People v. Martin, 4 IMI. 2d 105, 122 N.E.2d 245, 246
(1954):
The fiction was based upon the disability of the wife to own separate
property at conm on law, and her lack of capacity to maintain a
legal action independently of her husband.... Married women may
now own their separate property, and they may now sue and be
sued in their own right ....
No relevant reason which might have
supported the asserted common-law rule exists today.

Accord, Ex parte Estep, 129 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Tex. 1955).
The principal case, in holding that a husband and wife may be
guilty of conspiracy, seems to be in line with modern authority.
The trend of the courts has been to base more decisions on the
theory that women have been emancipated and to disregard the
common law fiction that a husband and wife are a single legaI
entity and incapable of conspiracy. In criminal cases the courts
have been slow to cast aside the protection afforded the wife under the common law but the principal case demonstrates that
even these barriers are giving way in the light of changing times.
This view assumes the more reasonable position that for the interest and protection of society as a whole, it is better to punish
a criminal offender than to preserve an outmoded common law
fiction.
Ray F. Drexler
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DomEsTiC IcELATIONS-DIVORCE-WIFE CANNOT RESTRAIN Hus-

BAND FROM GETTING DIVORCE IN FOREIGN CouiTRY.-Rosenbaum
-v. Rosenbaum ... N.Y. .. . , 130 N.E.2d 902 (1955). The plaintiff,
a resident and domiciliary of New York, sought to enjoin her
husband, who also resided and was domiciled in New York, from
proceeding with the prosecution of an action for divorce commenced by him in Mexico. The defendant instituted the divorce
action within one day, appearing in Mexico solely to sign the
divorce papers; he returned to New York the next day. A motion for a temporary injunction was filed by the plaintiff. The
defendant moved to dismiss the complaint. The supreme court
denied the plaintiff's motion and dismissed the complaint upon
defendant's motion. The plaintiff appealed and the appellate division reversed the orders of the lower court, granting the injunction with leave to defendant to appeal.
In granting leave to appeal the appellate division certified to the
court of appeals the question whether or not under the circumstances of this case, one spouse could enjoin the other from proceeding with a divorce action in a foreign country.
The court of appeals held that the plaintiff was not entitled to
an injunction, since she had an adequate remedy at law in an action for a declaratory judgment whenever her status as defendant's wife was put in doubt. Further, the expenses of the action
for the declaratory judgment could be assessed against the defendant. The court said there was no need to go to Mexico to
defend the divorce action there. The court stated that under the
principles of comity it had the power to deny validity to the
judgments of foreign countries for policy reasons. Hence even
if defendant sought recognition of his Mexican divorce in the
courts of New York, the courts could deny the validity of the
divorce decree and refuse to recognize it.
Courts of equity have traditionally been reluctant to interfere
in controversies growing out of merely domestic relations and
will ordinarily leave the parties to their remedies at law. Blanton
v. Blanton, 163 Ga. 361, 136 S.E. 141, 142 (1926) (dictum). It is
within the discretion of the court to enjoin the judicial proceedings of a foreign state or country, but there must be a clear showing that it would be inequitable, unfair and unjust to permit the
prosecution of the suit in the foreign jurisdiction. 2 STORY, EQUITY

JURISPRUDENCE § 1292 (14th ed. 1918). The question involves the
exercise of jurisdiction, not the existence of it. The authority of
the court rests on the power of the state to compel its citizens to
respect its laws, even beyond its territorial limits; the decree of
the court is directed to the party and not to the tribunal where
the suit is pending. 2 STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1224 (14th
ed. 1918).
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The problem before a court of equity as to the exercise of the
power of injunctive relief arises where a presumption of validity
exists in favor of a divorce decree. The full faith and credit clause
of the federal constitution, U. S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, requires that
full faith and credit be given to sister-state divorce decrees, obtained within the requirements of due process, by a spouse who
had acquired domicile under the laws of that sister-state. Williams
v. North Carolina,317 U.S. 287 (1942).
Certainly if decrees of a state altering the marital status of its
domiciliaries are not valid throughout the Union even though the
requirements of procedural due process are wholly met, a rule
would be fostered which could not help but bring "considerable
disaster to innocent persons". . . . 317 U.S. at 301.

However, in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1944),
it was subsequently decided that a state may deny the validity
of a divorce judgment of a sister-state on a finding that there was
no domicile which warranted the exercise of jurisdiction in
granting the divorce:
In short, the decree of divorce is a conclusive adjudication of everything except the jurisdictional facts upon which it is founded, and
domicil is a jurisdictional fact. To permit the necessary finding of
domicil by one State to foreclose all States in the protection of
their social institutions would be intolerable. 325 U.S. at 232.

The New York courts have been particularly active in litigation on the right of a spouse to enjoin the procurement of a divorce in a foreign jurisdiction. In Hammer v. Hammer, 303 N.Y.
481, 104 N.E.2d 864 (1952), and Garvin v. Garvin, 302 N.Y. 96,
96 N.E.2d 721 (1951), the New York Court of Appeals was presented with the question of whether a wife was entitled to enjoin her husband from prosecuting a divorce action within the
jurisdictional boundaries of the United States, where both parties were residents of New York. In each case, it was decided that
injunctive relief should be given to the wife. The courts considered the prima-facie value of a sister-state judgment under the
full faith and credit clause, a fact not applicable to the principal
case, as requiring the granting of injunctive relief.
The full faith and credit clause is not applicable to divorces
secured in foreign countries. Caldwell v. Caldwell, 298 N.Y. 146,
81 N.E.2d 60, 62 (1948) (dictum). The problem is whether a
court will recognize the decree under principles of comity. See
Golden v. Golden, 41 N.M. 356, 68 P.2d 928 (1937). A court,
therefore, should be able to balance the equities of the parties
and determine whether or not an injunction should be granted
to restrain the prosecution of a foreign divorce suit.
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The New York Court of Appeals in the principal case was of
the opinion that there was no need for an injunction since an
action for a declaratory judgment would fully satisfy the necessity for judicial relief. The wisdom of such a decision may be
considered in reference to Niver v. Niver, 200 Misc. 993, 111
N.Y.S.2d 889 (1951), where a husband went to Mexico and in
one day performed all the necessary steps to receive a divorce
in that jurisdiction. He then returned to his residence in New
York. A few months later he married another woman in Maryland. His first wife was granted a declaratory judgment voiding
the Mexican divorce, but it was still found necessary to grant
her an injunction preventing the husband from procuring an outof-state divorce in the future. Though the future validity of this
decision will be affected by the principal case, it shows that, contrary to the opinion of the majority in the instant case, a declaratory judgment alone may not provide full and adequate relief.
It was stated in dictum in the case at bar that the Mexican
divorce, if granted, would be a clear legal nullity. This reasoning
was founded on the fact that the plaintiff alleged no jurisdiction
existed in the Mexican court, and the defendant admitted this
allegation by his motion to dismiss. The dissenting opinion pointed out that the lack of jurisdiction of the Mexican court could
be assumed to be true only in this action, and that in a suit for
a declaratory judgment the plaintiff would have the burden
of proving that the defendant was not domiciled in Mexico at
the time of the decree. DeYoung v. DeYoung, 27 Cal.2d 521, 165
P.2d 457 (1946). Some Mexican divorces have been accorded
recognition by a failure to sustain this burden of proof of fraud.
Galloway v. Galloway, 116 Cal. App. 478, 2 P.2d 842 (1931).
In the absence of a federal statute concerning the recognition
of divorces obtained in foreign countries, or in the absence of
the exercise of the treaty making power, only state law-case
law and statutes-can govern. It is submitted that the courts
cannot effectively regulate foreign country divorce decrees unless they make free use of injunctive relief. In absence of such
a use, a litigant may evade the laws of his domicile, as by contracting a second marriage valid in the foreign jurisdiction. An
aggrieved party will be subjected to humiliation, doubt as to
marital status, worry, annoyance, and injury to her good name.
Strict and technical requirements of the law should give way
where inequity and fraud are involved.
Matthew J. Moran
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EVIDENCE - HEARSAY - ADMISSIBILITY OF HOSPITAL RECORDS
AS TO CAUSE OF ACCIDENT. - Williams v. Alexander, 309 N.Y. 283,
129 N.E.2d 417 (1955). The plaintiff brought this action to recover
for injuries sustained when he was struck by defendant's auto-

mobile at an intersection. At the trial plaintiff testified that defendant's car approached the intersection, and without diminishing speed, ran into him. The defendant testified that he came to a
full stop at the intersection, but that another car struck his from
behind forcing his car forward and upon plaintiff. During the
course of the trial plaintiff introduced as evidence those portions
of a hospital record relating to the diagnosis and treatment of his
injuries. To corraborate his testimony, defendant offered as evidence the remainder of the hospital record which plaintiff had
put in evidence. The portion of the record defendant offered contained a notation that plaintiff had stated to the examing physician that, "he was crossing the street and an automobile ran into another automobile that was at a standstill, causing this car
(standstill) to run into him." The plaintiff denied having made
this statement and the examining physician was not called as a
witness. The court admitted this portion of the record over plaintiff's objection that it contained hearsay. The trial court's judgment for defendant was affirmed on appeal. Plaintiff now appeals
to the court of appeals.
The issue presented to the court of appeals for the first time
was whether or not the entries in the hospital record relating to
the cause of the accident were admissible under N.Y. COv. PRAc.
ACT § 374-a, which permits entries in a record "made in the regular course of any business" to be admitted into evidence. The
court, in a four-to-three decision, reversed and granted a new
trial. The majority ruled that the entry was not "germane to
diagnosis or treatment" and therefore not made in the regular
course of the hospital's business. The minority was of the opinion
that by first introducing part of the record, the plaintiff vouched
for the accuracy and authenticity of the whole record and was
bound by it. Further, the entry was an "admission against interest" and admissible even in the absence of the statute.
At present, the federal government and over three-fourths of
the states have enacted statutes similar to section 374-a of the
New York Practice Act regulating the admission of business
records into evidence. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1519, 1520 (3d ed.

1940). The purpose of these statutes is to liberalize the strict
common law rules relating to the admission of business records
into evidence by eliminating the requirement that all parties who
participated in the making of the record be produced, if at all
possible, as witnesses, and requiring only that the records and
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entries be kept in the regular course of business. It is reasoned
that where the records are made in the regular course of business, and their accuracy is relied upon in conducting the business, there is a circumstantial probability that they are trustworthy. Shaffer v. Seas Shipping Co., 127 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Pa.
1954), affd', 218 F.2d 442 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973
(1955); Melton v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 363 Mo. 474, 251
S.W.2d 663 (1952); Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517,
518 (1930) (dictum); Weis v. Weis, 147 Ohio St. 416, 72 N.E.2d
245, 250 (1947) (dictum).
Hospital records come within the provisions of these statutes
and have been held to be admissible to show such things as the
physician's diagnosis of the patient's condition, the treatment
given, and the progress shown, for these matters are clearly
within the scope of the hospital's business. .Peoplev. Kohlmeyer,
284 N.Y. 366, 31 N.E.2d 490 (1940). Accord, New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Taylor, 147 F.2d 297, 303 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (dictum), af'd,
158 F.2d 328 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Wickman v. Bohie, 173 Md. 694,
196 Atl. 326, 329 (1938). A problem is presented, however, where
that portion of the hospital record which describes the cause of
the patient's injury is attempted to be put into evidence under
these statutes. The question then arises whether this portion of
the record was made in the regular course of the hospital's business. If the entry relating to the cause of the injury was essential
to the diagnosis and treatment of the patient, it is made in the
regular course of the hospital's business and is therefore admissible. D'Amato v. Johnston,140 Conn. 54, 97 A.2d 893 (1953).
In Commonwealth v. Harris,351 Pa. 325, 41 A.2d 688 (1945),
where a negro was on trial for murder, a hospital record containing a statement of the deceased that he was shot by an unknown white man was held inadmissible. The reason given was
that this entry was not ". . . pathologically germane to the physical or mental condition which caused the patient to come to the
hospital for treatment." It was none of the doctor's ".

.

. profes-

sional 'business' who shot the patient." 41 A.2d at 691. Thus the
record was not made in the regular course of the physician's
business.
Green v. City of Cleveland, 150 Ohio St. 441, 83 N.E.2d 63
(1948), also excluded the hospital record. The plaintiff claimed
that as she was attempting to get off defendant's streetcar, it
prematurely started and then suddenly stopped, causing her to
fall and be injured. An entry in the hospital record that the plaintiff stated she "fell of streetcar, caught heel" was not admitted
because it was not of ".

.

. observable facts or events incident to

the treatment" of the plaintiff. 83 N.E.2d at 65. The Missouri
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Supreme Court applied this test to the entry, "he states that he
walked into the front corner of a moving streetcar....." and held
it to be admissible. The court was of the opinion that the test did
not limit the entry to "observable facts" in the sense that they had
to be visual. If the entry indicated "how the plaintiff was injured" it was admissible even though it indicated the cause of
the accident. Melton v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 363 Mo. 474, 251
S.W.2d 663, 666 (1952). Under such a test, it seems that every
entry describing the cause of the accident would be admissible.
In Watts v. Delaware Coach Co., 5 Terry 283, 58 A.2d 689
(1948), the plaintiff alleged that his ankle was injured when defendant's bus driver closed the bus door on it. The court admitted the hospital record entry which stated: "patient states he
twisted ankle while walking along street," on the ground that it
was ".

.

. so related to the complaint or injury involved as to

facilitate prompt and intelligent diagnosis and treatment." 58 A.2d
at 695.
In Shaffer v. Seas Shipping Co., 127 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Pa.
1954), affd, 218 F.2d 442 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973
(1955), it was stated that how the injury occurred and what
caused it is usually important in diagnosing and treating the injury, and that this is evident from the fact that the patient's account of his injury is almost always recorded. While recognizing
that there might be some cases where this would not be true, the
court stated that it was not its function to draw the line.
Only one case seems to be in accord with the dissenting opinion
in the instant case. In that case, Fischer v. City of New York, 207
Misc. 528, 138 N.Y.S.2d 754 (Sup. Ct. 1955), a seventy-eight year
old woman was seriously injured when she fell while walking
on a public sidewalk. Much evidence tended to show that her fall
was caused by her tripping in a hole in the sidewalk. She told
the physician who examined her, however, that she had slipped
on a banana peel. This he recorded in the hospital record. There
were no witnesses to the accident, but at the trial, the woman
testified that her fall was caused by the hole in the sidewalk. She
later died and her husband sued for medical expenses and loss
of services. The court ruled that the entry was admissible under
the New York statute as an admission against interest, even if it
was not made in the course of business. In this case, unlike the
instant case, the examining physician was produced as a witness
and testified as to the entry. This case, however, was decided
prior to the decision in the instant case and its present validity
is doubtful.
The majority view in the principal case seems to present the
better view. The basis for admitting hospital records under §
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374-a of the New York Practice Act is the circumstantial probability of trustworthiness which is present in the record because of
the fact that the record is relied upon in treating the patient.
Entries which are not essential to the proper diagnosis and treatment of the patient are not endowed with this probability and
are therefore subject to all the objections and evils surrounding
hearsay evidence. To render a party bound by the untrustworthy
entry because he makes use of the trustworthy entries is to defeat
the purpose and intendment of the statute. On the whole, the
record in these instances should be treated as severable, as was
done in the instant case.
Vernon 0. Teofan

GAMBLING - MACHINES AND DEVICES - PINBALL MACHRNES AS
GAmING MAcHINEs PER SE. - Crystal Amusement Corp. v.

Northrop, 19 Conn. Sup. 498, 118 A.2d 467 (1955). A pinball machine was sold and delivered to the defendant by the plaintiff.
This machine had a "free play" feature; the machine would register scores established by the player and upon the attainment of
certain scores would automatically award additional rights to play
the machine without the further deposit of coins. There was no
money discharged by the machine, nor any tokens, merchandise,
etc. The plaintiff-vendor seeks to recover the contracted price;
defendant, a store keeper, did not dispute the sale nor any of its
terms but rather claimed that the use of the machine by his customers would have violated the law concerning gambling. Defendant claimed that since the subject matter of the sale when
put to use would have been illegal, the contract is unenforceable.
Conceding the unenforceability of the agreement if the subject matter or the use of it were illegal, the court considered
whether this free play pinball machine was a gambling device
prohibited by the Connecticut statutes. CoNN. GEN. STAT., §§
8655, 8656 (1949). The court saw a similarity between the Connecticut statutes and a corresponding statute of the District of
Columbia, D.C. CoDE ANN. § 22-1504 (1951), and followed the
opinion of Washington Coin Mach. Ass'n v. Callahan,142 F.2d 97
(D.C. Cir. 1944), in declaring that a pinball machine of the type
described was not a gambling machine within the purview of the
statute.
Gambling was not an unlawful activity at early English common
law. 8 TNE ComBIETE STATUTES OF ENGLAND 1104 (1929); CLARK
& MARSHALL, Cinvms 698 (5th ed. 1952). Statutes restricting
gambling by the regulation and prohibition of this activity be-
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gan to be common by the first half of the nineteenth century in
both England and the United States. Ludwig & Hughes, Bingo,
Morality and the Criminal Law, 1 CATHOLIC LAw. 8, 13 (1955).
Since the laws concerning gambling are statutory, the determination of whether a machine or device is illegal as a gambling machine is a matter of statutory construction. See State v. Waite,
156 Kan. 143, 131 P.2d 708, 148 A.L.R. 874 (1942).
The various statutes on the topic of gambling machines are
seen to stand in close relation when considered within the framework of the traditional elements of gambling: (1) consideration,
(2) chance, and (3) reward or prize. State v. One "Jack and
Jill" Pinball Machine, 224 S.W.2d 854, 860 (Mo. App. 1949);
Kraus v. City of Cleveland, 135 Ohio St. 43, 19 N.E.2d 159 (1939).
The first element merely consists of the risking of money or something of value on the outcome of the game. The second element is
a requirement that the outcome depend upon the operation of
chance rather than skill; it is not necessary that the result depend entirely upon chance; it is enough that chance be the dominating factor. See Annot., 135 A.L.R. 104 (1941). The third element is a requirement that some return may accrue to the player
of the game, resulting from the operation of chance.
Statutes vary considerably in the degree to which these elements are made explicit. An Indiana statute which defines
gambling machines, IND. ANN. STAT. § 10-2327 (Burns 1942),
clearly embodies all three elements. On the other hand, a corresponding statute of Iowa, IOWA CODE, ANN. § 726.5 (1950), em-

ploys far more general language, leaving considerable latitude to
the courts in determination of what type machines are within
the statute.
There are apparently no decisions which center on the first
element, consideration.
As to the second requirement there is little question that chance
is the dominant element as opposed to skill in the operation of
pinball machines. State v. Coats, 158 Ore. 122, 74 P.2d 1102, 1106
(1938). Some courts have taken notice that although long experience may develop some skill in the operation of pinball machines, chance still remains as the dominant element. State ex rel.
Dussault v. Kilburn, 111 Mont. 400, 109 P.2d 1113 (1941); State
v. Coats, supra. The uniformity of holdings that the dominant
element in the play of pinball machines is chance shows that
whatever variation does exist in statutes on the chance element
has little effect on ultimate results.
The statutory descriptions of that which constitutes a reward
or prize, the third element of gambling, are at great variance. A
return, by way of reward or prize, may be "merchandise . ..
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articles of value, checks, or tokens ... exchangeable for money
or any other thing of value," CAL. PEN. CODE § 330a (Deering
1949); CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 8655, 8656 (1949); "thing of value,"
N.Y. PEN. LAw § 982; "money or other property of value" or
"other valuable thing," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4603, 4605 (Purdon 1945).
Increasing the differences among the jurisdictions on the question of what is a sufficient return to satisfy the element of prize
are the variations put upon construction of the statutes by the
courts. The decisions, however, are uniform in two respects: (1)
pinball machines are held to be gambling machines within the
statutes if they discharge anything tangible such as money or
tokens; it makes no difference whether the tokens are for purposes of replay or for exchanging for merchandise, State ex rel.
Dussaultv. Kilburn, 111 Mont. 400, 109 P.2d 1113 (1941); Kraus
v. City of Cleveland, 135 Ohio St. 43, 19 N.E.2d 159 (1939); (2)
pinball machines are held to be gambling machines within the
statutes if the player receives from someone, such as the proprietor of the place where the machine is kept, merchandise or
money according to an established score or the number of free
games registered, although nothing is discharged by the machine
itself. Sparks v. State, 48 Ga. 498, 173 S.E. 216 (1934); In re
Sutton, 148 Pa. Super. 101, 24 A.2d 756 (1942).
The sharp difference of opinion as to whether the pinball
machines are gambling machines is found in the situation where
the machine does not discharge anything and there is no evidence
that the player of the machine is paid off on the basis of an established score or the number of games won, but rather the machine itself registers the number of free plays and automatically
adjusts so that the player may take advantage of the free plays
without further deposit of coins. Except for a few jurisdictions,
the statutes do not expressly mention whether such machines
are illegal; the determination is left to the courts. New York prohibits by statute this kind of free play machine. N.Y. PEN. LAW
§ 982. The court in People v. Gravenhorst, 32 N.Y.S.2d 760, 775
(1942), ignored the free play feature of the machine and held
that the machine was within the statute since amusement is a
thing of value when applied to devices of this type; in other words,
the court reached its decision without relying on the special clause
of the statute which brings free play machines within its scope.
Among the jurisdictions whose courts have considered whether
free play machines are within the statutes where the statutes do
not expressly mention free play machines, the cases indicate that
the majority holding is that free plays as an award for successful
operation of the pinball machines do not constitute property,
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valuable things, articles of value, etc. Washington Coin Mach.
Ass'n v. Callahan,142 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1944); Gayer v. Whelan,
59 Cal. App. 2d 255, 138 P.2d 763 (1943); State v. One "Jack and
Jill" Pinball Machine, 224 S.W.2d 854 (Mo. App. 1949). The
principal case comes within this authority. This means that the
third element of gambling is not satisfied and the machines are
not in themselves gambling machines. Contra, State v. Wiley,
232 IowA 443, 3 N.W.2d 620 (1942); Giomi v. Chase, 47 N.M. 22,
132 P.2d 715 (1942).
Recent legislative action in at least two states has contravened
judicial opinion that machines which award only free plays are
gambling machines. People v. One PinballMachine, 316 Ill. App.
161, 44 N.E.2d 950 (1942). The statute in effect at the time of
that case was ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38, § 342 (Smith-Hurd 1935).
The amendment of 1953 expressly excludes machines which reward the player with the "'right to replay." ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 38,
§ 342 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1955). The South Carolina legislature,
in 1949, amended the statute concerning slot machines to exempt
"nonpayout pin tables with free play feature," S.C. CODE § 5-621
(1952). The often quoted case of Alexander v. Hunnicutt, 196
S.C. 364, 13 S.E.2d 630 (1941), which held that the machines were
gambling machines under S.C. CODE § 1301-A (1932), would
ostensibly have been decided differently under the amended
statute.
Analysis of problems similar to that posed by the principal
case is facilitated by an understanding of the elements of gambling
and an awareness of the variant ways in which the statutes incorporate these elements. The reasons for the conflicting decisions may well be, and it is so indicated by the opinions, that
the courts are attaching varying weights to the interests of social policy in opposition to gambling and interests in favor of
construing penal statutes strictly. These interests conflict on the
narrow ground marked out by the principal case.
Eugene F. Waye

PHYSICIANS AND

SURGEONS-PROFESSIONAL

MISCONDUCT-FEE

SPLITTING AS GROUNDS FOR REvOCATION OF LiCENSE.-Forziati v.
Board of Registration in Medicine.... Mass. . . . , 128 N.E.2d

789 (1955). This case involves a suit for a declaratory decree
as to the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine to revoke the license of a registered physician
for acts amounting to gross misconduct in the practice of his profession. The plaintiff was engaged in a conspiracy with an attorney
at law in which the plaintiff solicited patients who came to him
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to employ the attorney to prosecute their personal injury claims.
After the patient paid the plaintiff for his medical services,
the attorney paid him in cash sums representing the difference
between the amount of the medical bill and one half of the
combined medical and legal fees. In this way the doctor and
the attorney received the same fee in each case regardless
of the relative amount of services performed by each of them.
The board enumerated 138 instances of this form of fee splitting
with a "kickback" in excess of $8,000 received by the doctor.
The Board was authorized by statute to revoke a physician's
license if it was found that he was guilty of "gross misconduct
in the practice of his profession."
The court was called upon to determine whether the plaintiff's fee splitting operations constituted "gross misconduct"
within the meaning of the statute. After concluding that these
actions of the plaintiff conflicted with his moral obligations
as a physician, the court entered a final decree to the effect
that the Board could proceed against the plaintiff on his being charged with gross misconduct in the practice of his profession because of his fee splitting activities.
It is well settled that the power of certain state boards to
regulate the granting of licenses to practice medicine, and the
power to revoke for proper cause licenses already granted, is
an exercise of the police power of the state. State ex Tel. Lentine
v. State Bd. of Health, 334 Mo. 220, 65 S.W.2d. 943, 949 (1933)
(dictum). And while there are several decisions holding that
moral turpitude is grounds for revoking a physician's license,
Du Vall v. Board of Medical Examiners, 49 Ariz. 329, 66 P.2d
1026 (1937); Brainard v. Board of Medical Examiners, 68 Cal.
App. 2d 591, 157 P.2d 7 (1945); Hartman v. Board of Chiropractic
Examiners, 20 Cal. App. 2d 76, 66 P.2d 705 (1937), this discussion will be confined to those situations involving gross misconduct or dishonorable conduct in the practice of the profession as
grounds for barring a physician from his practice.
In State ex rel. Lentine v. State Bd. of Health, supra,a licensed
physician and surgeon participated in a conspiracy to procure, by
corruption and bribery, licenses for six or seven men to practice
medicine in the State of Illinois. These men could not qualify to
practice medicine under the laws of that state. The relator was a
licensed physician in Missouri and the state board of health revoked his license because of his participation in the conspiracy.
The Missouri statute authorized the board to revoke the license
of a physician and surgeon if he was a person of "bad moral character" or guilty of "unprofessional or dishonorable conduct." The
court held that the use of these general terms did not render
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the statute unenforceable for indefiniteness. Interpreting these
statutory terms to refer to conduct which in common judgment
is deemed unprofessional and dishonorable, the court affirmed
the action of the board.
In State Bd. v. Ferry, 172 Pa. Super. 372, 94 A.2d 121 (1953),
the defendant physician was charged with aiding and abetting unlicensed persons in the practice of medicine. The defendant hired
an assistant who had no license to practice medicine, but he nevertheless allowed him to examine patients, prescribe treatment, and
charge fees for his services. The state board of medical education
and licensure was authorized by statute to revoke the right to
practice medicine upon proof of grossly unethical practice. Noting
that the legislature had not said what it meant by "grossly unethical practice" the court stated that it was similar to unprofessional
conduct. The court concluded that defendant's conduct in aiding
an unlicensed person in the illegal practice of medicine was "grossly unethical practice" within the meaning of the statute, and on
that basis affirmed the revocation of his license.
In the case of In re Walk-er's License, 210 Minn. 337, 300 N. W.
800 (1941), a veterinarian's license was revoked on the ground
that he had allowed his professional name to be used by another
not licensed as a veterinarian. The statute provided for revocation
of a license for "gross moral or professional misconduct." The state
board of veterinary medical examiners held that the veterinarian
was guilty of gross professional misconduct. This conclusion was
upheld by the court. In construing the words "gross moral or professional misconduct," the court stated that this involved conduct
which in "common judgment" was dishonorable. 300 N.W. at 801.
In Lieberman v. State Bd. of Examiners, 130 Conn. 344, 34 A.2d
213 (1943), the plaintiff was employed as an optometrist, receiving a commission on all optical goods sold in his employer's store.
If the patients purchased their spectacles in the store no fee for
optometrical service was charged, but if a patient did not purchase
his spectacles in the store the optometrist charged a fee and turned
it over to the store. The advertising of the optometrical services
was done in such a way as to mislead the public regarding the
nature of the relationship between the optometrist and the store.
The statute regulating optometrists authorized the board of examiners to revoke a license for "unprofessional conduct." The
board had revoked plaintiff's license on this and other grounds.
The court sustained the board on the basis that the advertising
scheme rendered plaintiff guilty of unprofessional conduct.
Another case involving a licensed optometrist is Sanchick v.
State Bd. of Examiners, 342 Mich. 555, 70 N.W.2d 757 (1955).
There an optometrist employed a "capper" or "steerer" to obtain
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business for him The statute provided that the board of examiners
could revoke an optometrist's license for "grossly unprofessional,
unethical and dishonest conduct of a character likely to deceive
the public." The board determined that petitioner's activities came
within the express prohibition of that part of the statute defining
unprofessional and dishonest conduct as including the employment of a "capper" or "steerer." This determination was upheld
by the court against an argument that the terms of the statute
quoted above were too indefinite. The court stated that the terms
"unprofessional" and "dishonest" were expressly defined to include petitioner's activities, and further since these actions were
unprofessional and dishonest they must be "unethical" by any
standard of ethics.
In Bell v. Board of Regents, 295 N.Y. 101, 65 N.E.2d 184 (1946),
a licensed dentist employed a layman as an agent to obtain patients
for him. The agent was paid on a commission basis. The board suspended the dentist's license for one year under a statute providing
that the license of a practitioner of dentistry may be revoked, suspended or annulled, for "unprofessional conduct." The court stated
that it was a matter of common knowledge that the activities of
the dentist involved here were unprofessional. Upon this basis, the
board's determination was confirmed.
From the cases which have been set forth above, it would seem
that what the courts require of physicians, veterinarians, optometrists, dentists and others of similar professional calibre in dealing with their patients or clients, is simply honesty and fairness.
So far as fee-splitting practices are concerned, such as in the principal case, the writer was unable to find any other instance where
the propriety of this specific type of activity has been passed upon
by the courts. The medical profession itself recognizes that billing
procedures which tend to induce physicians to split fees with nonphysicians are unethical. PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETmcs OF
AMERICAN MEDICAL AssOCIATION § 6 (1955).
In view of the position taken by the American Medical Association on the matter of fee-splitting, and the requirement of the
courts that physicians conduct themselves with strict fairness and
honesty in dealing with their patients, it is submitted that the
plaintiff in the instant case was rightly barred from the further
practice of his profession.
David JT. Eardley
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TORTS - FAMILY RELATIONS - CHILD HAS CLAIM UPON WHICH
RELIEF MAY BE GRANTED AS A RESULT OF NEGLIGENT INJURY TO
v. Meredith, 134 F. Supp. 868 (D. Hawaii
1955). The plaintiff's mother was negligently injured by defendant. Plaintiffs, the five minor children of the injured person,
brought this action for loss of "support, maintenance, education,
nurture, care, training, attention, acts of kindness, comfort, and
solace," which they allegedly suffered as a proximate result of
the injury to their mother. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The court, therefore, was presented with the question whether
a minor child has a claim for damages against one who negligently hnjures the child's parent. After tracing the development of
the growth of the protection of family interests in the Hawaiian
courts from 1860, and recognizing that damages from the loss of
parental care, training, guidance, etc., up until this time had only
been recovered in cases arising under the wrongful death statute,
PARENT. -Scruggs

the court nevertheless stated that ".

.

. the cause of action is not

founded upon the degree or quantity of loss. Rather is it premised
upon an invasion of a right." 134 F. Supp. at 871. Denying the
defendant's motion to dismiss, the court held that the complaint
stated a claim upon which relief could be granted.
This decision represents another step in the continuing development of the Anglo-American law of family relations. The
common law has always recognized in the husband a right to recover for the loss of the consortium of his wife. 3 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 140. The wife's right to sue for loss of consortium
of the husband has not been as fully recognized. Today, a majority of the courts take the view that a wife may only recover in
cases of intentional or malicious alienation of the husband's affections, Fleming v. Fisk, 87 F.2d 747 (D. C. Cir. 1936); or in
cases of criminal conversation, Knighten v. McClain, 227 N.C.
682, 44 S.E.2d 79 (1947). In 1950, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit granted recovery to a wife for loss
of consortium which was the result of a negligent injury to her
husband. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950). Recovery was awarded even though
the court was ". . . not unaware of the unanimity of authority
elsewhere denying the wife recovery .... ." 183 F.2d at 812. The

Hitaffer case was instrumental in setting the stage for the decision
in the principal case; for as one writer so aptly stated, the case
showed a ".

.

. positive inclination of the appellate courts to ex-

pand the common law according to a changing society and a new
attitude toward the relative position of members of the family." 2
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ST. Louis U.L.J. 305, 308 (1953).
Scholars in the field of domestic relations have long recognized
certain interests in children arising out of the family relationship
and have advocated protection of these interests by the courts.
Dean Pound, in a discussion on the subject, Individual Interests
in the Domestic Relations, 14 1MicH. L. REv. 177, 185 (1916),
stated:
[The child] has an interest in the society and affection of the
parent, at least while he remains in the household. But the law has
done little to secure these interests. At common law there are no
legal rights which protect them.

Professor Green has also made mention of the same deficiency in
the law. Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REv. 460, 484
(1934). See also PROSSER, TORTS 696 (2d ed. 1955). Until recent
years these interests have been protected judicially only through
legislation. 39 Am. Jim., Parentand Child § 71 (1939). This legislation, in the form of wrongful death statutes, Clark v. Prime,
18 N.J. Iisc. 226, 12 A.2d 635 (1940), workmen's compensation
statutes, Silver King Coalition Mines Co. v. Industrial Comm'n,
101 Utah 12, 116 P.2d 771 (1941), and civil damage acts, Hughes
v. State ex rel. Sutton, 50 Ind. App. 617, 98 N.E. 839 (1912), has
been very valuable to the child, for in suits arising under these
statutes the courts have consistently taken into consideration the
child's loss of parental comfort, society, nurture, training, etc.,
when setting the amount of damages. Dowell, Inc. v. Jowers, 166
F.2d 214, 220 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 832 (1948); St.
Louis & N.A. Ry. v. Mathis, 76 Ark. 184, 91 S.W. 763 (1906);
Clark v. Prime, supra; Carterv. West Jersey & S. Ry., 76 N.J.L.
602, 71 Atl. 253 (1908). Since the decision of Daily v. Parker,152
F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945), a small minority of jurisdictions have
allowed the child to recover for loss of parental care, nurture,
etc., resulting from the alienation of a parent's affections. See
Note, 32 B.U.L. REV. 82 (1952).
The writer has found only three other instances in which the
problem in the principal case has come before the courts. Eschebach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378, 263 N.W. 154 (1935), was probably the first case involving this problem. There the wife and
three minor children sued for damages for the negligent injury

of the husband-father in an automobile accident. Defendants demurred to the cause of action. The demurrer was sustained. In
Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hospital,108 F. Supp. 739 (D.D.C. 1952),
a daughter sued for her loss of comfort, aid, kindness, and assistance which she sustained as a result of negligent injury to
her mother. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint and his
motion was granted. Arizona considered the problem in Jeune v.
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Del E. Webb Const. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269 P.2d 723 (1954). The
husband-father was negligently injured. The wife sued for her
loss of consortium and, as the child's next friend, for the child's
loss of support, education, parental comfort, etc. The state supreme court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
In refusing to recognize a cause of action in the child for his
loss of nurture, training, etc., as a result of a negligent injury to
the parent, the courts have given six principal reasons as governing their decisions. The case of Eschenbach v. Benjamin, supra,
sets out three of these reasons. The court in that case expressed
a fear of the possibility that double damages would be awarded
in a suit in which a parent sues for his injuries and the child
sues for loss of care, nurture, etc. It also stated that the action
could not lie because the child's loss is an indirect result of the
negligent act causing the injury to the parent. Thirdly, it submitted that if such recovery were allowed, each minor child would
have a cause of action, all of which actions would be based on a
single tort.
Careful consideration of these arguments seems to reveal weaknesses in all of them. The threat of double damages has been overcome in cases in which the wife has recovered for her loss of
consortium as a result of the negligent injury to her husband,
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., supra, 183 F.2d at 819, where the court
said insofar as the wife's damage corresponded to the husband's
damages, her recovery would be relatively reduced. It seems as
though the child's damages for loss of care, nurture, etc., could
be treated similarly to those recovered by t.-.e wife in consortium
cases. Admitting the court's second argument that the child's
loss is an indirect result of the negligent act, can it be validly
argued that such a loss is not a probable consequence of the
negligence, or that the negligence was not an appreciable cause
of the damage to the child? It seems not. The third argument, regarding the possibility of a large number of suits arising from a
single tort, seems to have been countered by one writer who
said,

"...

if the child really should have a cause of action, the

existence of similar ones ought not to prevent his recovery." 39
CALIF. L. REv. 294, 298 (1951).
In Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, supra, two more theories
which have been advanced to defeat this cause of action were set
out. One of the main factors the court in that case relied upon
was the fact that such a cause of action had never before been
allowed. But the court seemingly contradicted itself by stating
that the novelty of an action in itself is not sufficient to prevent
recovery. 108 F. Supp. at 740. The court's second argument was
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that a lower court should be cautious in laying down a completely new rule. The court said this even though it conceded that
"when a child loses the love and companionship of a parent, it is
deprived of something that is indeed valuable and precious." 108
F. Supp. at 741. And the court further admitted that on the basis
of natural justice it was difficult for it to ".... reach the"conclusion that this type of an action will not lie." Ibid. It seems that in
the face of a definite and recognized need for a rule, the court's
caution should be superseded by its duty to give redress for the
wrong.
The court in Jeune v. Del E. Well Const. Co., supra, set forth
another reason for not allowing the child's cause of action for loss
of parental affection, etc., by expressing the belief that any cause
of action for personal injury to the parent rests with the parent
for all resulting damage. This rule seems questionable when it is
recognized that the child in these cases is suing in his own right
for an injury to an interest peculiar to himself. See Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MiCH. L. REv. 177,
185-86 (1916).
If one admits that the child has a legally protected interest in
parental affections, comfort, nurture, etc., the doctrine ubi jus ibi
remedium, where there is a right there is a remedy, which is
firmly embedded in Anglo-American legal theory, seems to demand that the child should be allowed to recover damages when
this interest is infringed. The Hawaiian court by recognizing the
child's claim in the principal case has severed its former ties with
precedent in cases of this nature, but not without good cause. It
is submitted that the importance of this case derives from the
fact that the court has recognized this interest on the part of the
child at a time when the negative attitude toward it has not yet
had an opportunity to become too firmly entrenched in the thinking of the American courts. It is not to be assumed that other
courts will immediately align themselves with the Hawaiian
court in their consideration of this problem. The transition, if and
when it does come, will necessarily be a slow one, for:
[Judges] must go with the main body not with the advance
guard, and with the main body only when it has attained reasonably fixed and settled conceptions.... When we reflect how fundamental is the shifting from the older idea of the end of the legal
order to the newer... how completely the change goes to the root
of everything the courts do, we must recognize how futile it is to
expect the courts to adjust our whole legal system to it over night.
(Emphasis added.) PoUND, Tim SPIRT OF THE CohmoN LAw 191

(1921).
George A. Patterson
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TORTS-FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-TEST FOR DETERMINING
LIABILITY OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS.

-Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U. S. 61 (1955). Petitioners sought recovery under the Federal Tort Claims Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2671 (1952), for damages alleged to have been caused
by the negligence of the United States Coast Guard in the operation of a lighthouse. A tug, owned by petitioner, towing a barge
went aground, and sea water wetted and damaged the cargo. Petitioner alleged that the grounding of the tug was due solely to improper functioning of the light which was caused by the negligence of the Coast Guard in failing to check the lighting system
and in failing to make proper and regular examinations and repairs. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal
of the case on the ground that the Government had not consented
to be sued in the manner in which this suit was brought. The
Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the judgment of
the court of appeals, but a petition for rehearing was granted.
Upon rehearing, the Supreme Court was presented with the
problem of determining the extent of liability of the Federal Government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, supra. Congress
provided, in 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1952), that, "the United States shall
be liable .. . in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances . . . ." In the instant

case, the operation of a lighthouse is confined exclusively to the
federal government unless a private individual obtains authority
to do so from the Coast Guard, as provided for in 14 U.S.C. § 83
(1952).
The Government's contention that the language of the Tort
Claims Act imposing liability ".

.

. in the same manner and to

the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances
. . ." must be read as excluding liability in the performance of
activities which private persons do not perform was accepted
by the court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The
Court said that the test of liability under the act was not "the
presence or absence of identical private activity" but whether
a private person would be liable had he committed the same act.
It is established that the United States is liable for the tortious
acts of its agents that occur within a particular jurisdiction if a
private individual would be liable for a similar act committed
within the same jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1952). However, in the principal case, the Court was not concerned with an
act that may also be committed by a private individual, but rather
with an act that ordinarily a private individual cannot perform.
In Cerri v. United States, 80 F. Supp. 831 (N.D. Cal. 1948), an
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innocent bystander in San Francisco was injured by a stray
bullet discharged by a United States Army military policeman.
The Government denied liability because under California law
a municipality is not liable for the tortious acts of police officers
committed while acting in the line of duty. In rejecting this argument, the court advanced the following explanation of the liability
intended to be imposed upon the Government by the Federal
Tort Claims Act, 80 F. Supp. at 833:
The defense that this act does not apply to those cases wherein

the negligence occurred during the exercise of a sovereign power
of the United States, if heeded, would create a twilight zone of
governmental activities in which the consent given by this statute
could not be applied. Too numerous are the affairs of a purely
governmental or sovereign nature, prohibited to or not duplicated
by the activities of private individuals, to consider this to be the
intent of Congress. Certainly, the statute itself makes no distinction
between governmental activities of a sovereign nature and those of
a proprietary nature...

The court interpreted the act as imposing liability upon the
United States for injury to private individuals resulting"from the
discharge of either "governmental" functions or "proprietary"
functions, though the same tortious conduct would not render a
municipality liable within the particular jurisdiction where the
incident occurred. Thus, because Congress in the Federal Tort
Claims Act has consented to treatment of the federal government as a private person and not as a municipality when negligent
acts of federal employees result in injury to private persons, the
division in municipal law between "governmental" and "proprietary" activities of the sovereign has no place in establishing the
liability of the federal government under the act.
The distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary"
functions was also rejected in Somerset Seafood Co. v. United
States, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951). A vessel owned by the plaintiff was stranded on a wrecked battleship which had been sunk
by the United States. The United States had failed to mark the
sunken ship. The court adopted a liberal interpretation of the
act in rejecting the contention of the Government that it was
not intended to impose liability on the United States for damages
arising out of the exercise of "governmental" functions.
Mid-CentralFish Co. v. United States, 112 F. Supp. 792 (W.D.
Mo. 1953), involved the dissemination of weather information.
Though the claim was dismissed, one of the grounds being because there was no diaty to promulgate the weather information
for the benefit of a private citizen, the court nevertheless opined
that the distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary"
functions was erroneous. 112 F. Supp. at 795 (dictum). There-
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fore if the federal government undertook a duty for the benefit
of a particular group, as in the case under discussion, liability
would follow for a negligent performance thereof. And upon
appeal, 210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954), the dismissal was affirmed
as the court further reasoned that because of the statute, 33
U.S.C. § 702c (1952), which declared that no liability shall
attach upon the United States for damage arising from flood
waters, the Federal Tort Claims Act was not controlling for it
did not expressly repeal such statute. The court thereby decided that if the federal government was exempt from liability
by another statute, the terms of the Federal Tort Claims Act
would not apply in attempting to fasten liability upon the United
States regardless of the "governmental" or "proprietary" nature
of the activity.
The performance of the duty of operating a lighthouse in the
instant case could be performed by a private individual only if
authorized by the United States Coast Guard. 14 U.S.C. § 83
(1952). A somewhat similar situation is found in Eastern Air
Lines Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
There two planes collided while attempting to land at a controlled public airport owned by the United States. The court
held the United States liable for damages and stated that though
few private persons choose to construct and operate an airport,
there is no reason why a private individual or corporation could
not construct an airport and operate a control tower manned
by its own operators certified by the Civil Aeronautics Administration. In such a case, the individual or corporation would be
liable for the negligence of privately employed tower operators.
And even if the Government should attempt to relieve itself
from liability by contract for the negligent operation of the airport, the existence of such a contract is no defense to an action
against the airport. Air Transport Associates, Inc. v. United
States, 221 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1955). In that case the plaintiff,
upon landing at the airfield at night and according to instructions
from the airport control tower, collided with a truck that was
stalled on the runway. The court held there was no distinction
between proprietary and sovereign functions under the Federal
Tort Claims Act, and that because the airport was a public service, the exculpatory clause was contrary to the public policy
of those jurisdictions in which the contract was to operate and
therefore invalid.
Justice Jackson, dissenting in Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15, 47 (1953), said that the purpose of the act in question
is to compensate those who are victims of negligent conduct in
the performance of various governmental activities; to hold otherwise would result in the Court sanctioning the negligent ope-
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ration of governmental activities and permit the Government
to perform its activities with indifference toward the rights of
the private citizen.
In interpreting the provision of the act "... to the same extent
as a private individual under like circumstances. .. ," the
Supreme Court in the instant case devised the test of whether
a private individual would be liable had he performed the same
act and rejected the argument of the Government that the provision must be read as excluding liability in the performance
of activities which private persons do not perform. It is submitted that the distinction between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions should be immaterial in fixing liability upon
the United States under this particular act. Rather the courts
should concern themselves with ascertaining whether an individual person would be liable for the same act. Hence it is felt
that the test of liability propounded by the Court is the only
correct one.
John F. Chmiel

